provisions. 3 Further, many wondered whether U.S. consumers would stand for companies providing higher levels of protection for European consumers than for U.S. consumers.1 4 Following the close of the Safe Harbor program's first year, many are continuing to call the U.S. Legislature to abandon the Safe Harbor selfregulatory program and enact broad privacy laws. 5 This note, however, will show that in light of the first year of Safe Harbor, the United States policy of self-regulation in the private sector based upon its capitalistic market economy is actually strengthened and that the program is proving beneficial to both U.S. organizations and U.S. citizens. The analysis will begin in Section II with a comparison of privacy policies under European and United States perspectives.
Section M will present the development and guidelines of the Directive and the provisions of the Safe Harbor compromise negotiated by the EU and the United States. Finally, Section IV will show how U.S. companies have responded to the Safe Harbor program in its first year, how U.S. companies have weighed the benefits and costs associated with Safe Harbor, and how Safe Harbor has impacted U.S. companies, U.S. citizens, and U.S. policy as a whole.
II. A COMPARISON OF THE EU AND U.S. APPROACHES TO DATA PRIVACY LAW

A. European Approach
To understand the conflict the United States has had in collaborating with the terms of the EU's Directive, the two governmental approaches on privacy issues must first be discussed. While the United States has long sought to avoid broad policy laws and allow industries to self-regulate protection of data privacy matters, 6 European nations have recognized individual data privacy as a fundamental right, 7 leading many European 13. See id. See also Gruenwald, supra note 11. Many experts feel that the plan will fall apart as U.S. companies fail to join the safe harbor program. See id.
14. See Gruenwald, supra note 11. governments to enact "rights-based data protection." 'I 8 The history of European data privacy protection law goes back to 1970 when the German state of Hesse enacted the first data protection statute.' 9 Sweden soon followed in enacting the first national data protection statute.
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y 1997, most European nations 2 ' had broad policy or data protection statutes. 22 The 1980's opened with the Committee of Ministers of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issuing their Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (Guidelines). 23 The Guidelines presented basic data privacy principles and allowed for data to freely pass between nations who adopted the principles. 24 The OECD intended that these "principles... be built into existing national legislation, or serve as a basis for legislation in those countries which do not yet have it." ' 25 One year following the issuance of the Guidelines, the Council of Europe promulgated a convention, For the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, which took effect in 1985. 26 The convention focused more heavily on protection of personal fundamental human right. There are a number of reasons for this belief, including the vast and traumatic experiences of the Nazi regime during the 1940's. Another reason for this perspective is the simple fact that many EU countries are relatively new democracies. Hearings, supra note 15, at 5. (statement by Hon. W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman, CEC). This recognition of privacy rights as fundamental was codified in Chapter I, Article 1, of the Directive where it states,
In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 1, at art. 461, 466 (2000) , citing GUIDELINES, supra note 23. The principles set forth in the Guidelines were intended as a response to the "danger that disparities in national legislations could hamper the free flow of personal data across frontiers." Id. These principles are largely mirrored in the Directive. See id.
26. See CATE, supra note 3, at 34. Both the Guidelines and the convention are criticized due to the lack of enforcement power held by the OECD and the Council. See id. However, where the Guidelines failed to set a vision for how countries should work together to bridge their different protection standards, the Convention focused on "stregthen[ing] democracy, human rights, and the rule of law throughout its member states" and attempted to inform national legislation on the uniform protection of personal data. Fromholz, supra note 25, at 466, [Vol. 12:2 privacy than the Guidelines and required member countries to enact conforming national laws. Following the Council of Europe's urging EU Member States to ratify and implement the convention, by 1997 all but one of the EU Member States had national legislation consistent with the convention. 28 The enactment of the Directive in 1998 acted as a harmonization of the domestic privacy laws of many of the member states. 29 European data protection laws include the hidden agenda discouraging a recurrence of the Nazi and Gestapo efforts to control the population, and so seek to prevent the reappearance of an oppressive bureaucracy that might use existing data for nefarious purposes. This concern is such a vital foundation of current legislation that it is rarely expressed in formal discussions. This helps to explain the general European preference for strict licensing systems of data protection .... Thus European legislators have reflected a real fear of Big Brother based on common experience with the potential destructiveness of surveillance through record-keeping. None wish to repeat the experiences endured under the Nazis during the second World War. to do away with any distinction between information gathered from private and public sectors. 33 In 1995, the Council of Ministers formally approved the Directive which would take effect three years later.'
Id
B. United States Approach
While Europe has moved from individual states enacting rights-based data protection in the 1970's and 1980's to a uniform broad-based political information protection in the 1990's, the United States has consistently held to its market-based, industry-regulated approach. 35 The U.S. Constitution does not address privacy and personal autonomy directly, and therefore, privacy rights in general were not recognized as fundamental for many years.
3 6 The Supreme Court expanded the term "liberty" over the last century to include certain privacy protections for U.S. citizens. 37 In this expansion, the Supreme Court has interpreted a number of the Bill of Rights amendments as providing a right to privacy against intrusive governmental activities." These individual fundamental rights of privacy, however, are limited to protection from the public, governmental sector, unless otherwise provided by state action.
39
U.S. privacy law in the private sector can be a bit troubling as Congressional privacy protections in general provide little help.' Adding to the confusion in the private sector, the definition of "privacy" itself seems to change from one area of the law to another. One author described this inconsistency: "Privacy is a notoriously slippery term. Because The purpose of the U.S. approach is based upon the premise that information privacy is not an unlimited or absolute right.
43 U.S. policy, therefore, seeks to draw a balance between the individual's desire to maintain a level of privacy over his personal information and society's benefit in its use of such information." In its continued attempt to steer clear of broad-privacy policies while providing a means for appropriate personal information protection, the U.S. continues to approach data-privacy in the private sector through issuance of regulations and statutes protecting specific types of data. 45 Specifically, the U.S. has regulated privacy in five areas: federal statutes and regulations, state statutes and regulations, state common law, self-regulation, and through the EU Directive. ' With regard to the first area, federal statutes, Congress has passed a number of enactments intended to protect individual privacy data that is specific to the area of the enactment. 4 Stat. 1936 Stat. (1996 . This statute was created by the 104th Congress to "improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for other purposes." Id. 
H. ELEMENTS OF THE DIRECTIVE AND THE U.S.-EU COMPROMISE
With the two approaches towards protecting private information so drastically opposing, it is no wonder that the U.S. struggled with the EU's development of the Directive in 1995. In particular, the U.S. conflict with the Directive arises under the Directive's "adequacy" requirement, 6 0 where EU Member States are prohibited from transferring personal data 6 to any non-EU country that fails to provide "adequate" privacy protection.
62 As a result of this requirement being aimed at receiving countries rather than receiving organizations, the Directive forces these countries to enact broad privacy laws if they desire to continue receiving this information from EU countries.
63
Without such broad legislation, the EU argues that the basic purpose of the Directive, to protect personal information from citizens within the EU community, would be undermined. 64 The 61. Under the Directive, "Personal Data" is defined broadly as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person." Id. at art. 2(a). Thus, Personal Data includes more than mere textual information but also photographs, audiovisual images, and sound recordings of an identified or identifiable person. See CATE, supra note 3, at 36. Additionally, under this definition personal data is protected for any "natural person" rather than just a "living person," meaning that the requirements to protect an individual's private information continues on beyond life. See id.
62. See Assay, supra note 3, at 146. "Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data... may take place only if ... the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection." Directive 951461EC, supra note 1, at art 25(1). In his address to the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, David Smith, the Assistant Information Commissioner from the United Kingdom, stated, "What is actually meant by 'adequacy'? It doesn't necessarily require data protection law. It does depend on the nature of the data that are transferred, codes of practice, enforceable codes, and the like, that exist in the country involved." Hearing, supra note 15, at 15 (testimony of David Smith, Assistant Commissioner, Office of the UK Information Commissioner).
63. See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 1, at art. 25(1). "The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection." Id.
64. See CATE, supra note 3, at 41.
adequacy "in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations." ' 5 The Directive does, however, provide certain exceptions to the requirement for recipient countries to enact broad privacy laws. 66 Article 26(2) states:
A Member State may authorize transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection within the meaning of Article 25(2), where the controller adduces adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as regards the exercise of the corresponding rights. 67 In response to this provision, a few countries, 68 the U.S. being the first, have accepted "Safe Harbor" provisions as negotiated between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the EU . 69 The Safe Harbor provisions allow companies based within these countries to individually adopt regulatory principles that govern their use of data received from organizations based within the EU countries. 70 As an additional method, the EU has recently approved a standard contractual clause for data transfer to non-EU countries." Approved on June 18, 2001, these contract clauses ensure adequate safeguards for personal data transferred from the EU to countries outside the EU. In order to maintain the transfer of data from European nations to U.S. companies, the Department of Commerce initiated negotiations with the EU in 1998. 73 Throughout the negotiations, both the U.S. and the EU were in agreement that levels of U.S. privacy protection needed improvement. 74 Both parties, however, continued to disagree on the nature of the improvement, each holding to their privacy policy approaches. 75 While the EU continued to call on the U.S. to enact federal legislation governing commercial entities' use of personal information transferred from EU Member States, the Department of Commerce continued to hold to its industry self-regulation approach.
76
simply calls for the "Data Exporter" and the "Data Importer" to undertake the transfer process in accordance with the basic protection rules provided for in the Directive. See id. Frits Bokestein, the EU Internal Market Commissioner, stated, "This new practical measure will make it easier for companies and organizations to comply with their obligation to ensure 'adequate protection' for personal data transferred from the Community to the rest of the world while safeguarding individuals' right to privacy." Id. This view, however, is not shared by all. In his address to the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Chairman Tauzin expressed his fear that the contracts are merely providing additional protection on top of Safe Harbor for the EU community. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 6 (statement by Hon. W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman, CEC). In his address he stated, "Many experts have suggested that the model contracts will be imposed on U.S. firms as a way to 'top off or strengthen the Safe Harbor. This seems to directly contradict the purpose of the Safe Harbor and the negotiations that took place. Was the Department of Commerce duped into supporting the Safe Harbor? Are the Europeans really trying to find ways to strengthen the Privacy Directive?" Id.
73. See Safe Harbor, supra note 9, at 45,666. After the EU found that U.S. information privacy laws failed to meet this adequacy requirement, the EU began negotiations with the U.S. Department of Commerce pursuant to Article 25(5) which states, "At the appropriate time, the Commission shall enter into negotiations with a view of remedying the situation resulting from the finding made pursuant to paragraph 4." Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 1, at art. 25(5 protection provisions to the EU that would allow U.S. companies who comply with Safe Harbor to receive and use personal data from EU Member States by granting a presumption of "adequacy" for purposes of the Directive. 78 The Safe Harbor framework is comprised of seven privacy principles that, when followed, qualify organizations for this protection.
79
The first principle, "Notice," requires an organization to inform individuals about the purpose for which it collects and uses their personal information." 0 Further, the notice requirement mandates that the organization provide contact information to the individual so that the individual may inquire into the organization's use of the information. 8 ' This includes allowing the individual to lodge a complaint, inquire as to the types of third parties to which the information may be disclosed, and have opportunities available to limit such disclosure.
8 2 The notice must be in "clear and conspicuous" language.
83
Under the second requirement, "Choice," the organization must provide the individual an opportunity to "opt out" of disclosing their information to third parties or to use the information for a purpose other than what was originally authorized by the individual.' Again, the option for this choice id. Second, the U.S. would not accept European jurisdiction. See id. The EU and the U.S. did finally agree to be silent on this issue, but the voluntary self-regulatory scheme of Safe Harbor is under the framework of existing U.S. law. See id. Third, in order to adapt the provisions of the Directive to the advanced information economy of the U.S., the U.S. felt that the Safe Harbor principles must be more flexible and address real-world information practices. See id.
The EU also had a bottom line position. [Vol. 12:2 must be made to the individual with "clear and conspicuous" language by the organization." s Third, where the organization is transferring personal information to an agency of the organization, it may do so only where the agent has either adopted the privacy principles set out in the Directive or contracted with the organization to adopt adequate privacy policies concerning the information. 86 This "Onward Transfer" requirement provides protection for the organization if, after complying with this provision, the third party agent misuses the information. 87 The fourth and fifth principles are designed to protect the treatment of the transferred information. 8 The fourth provision, "Security," directs the organization to take reasonable precautions to protect the personal information it uses or disseminates from "loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction." 8 9 Under the fifth principle, "Data Integrity," the organization is required to limit the use of such information only to where it is relevant for its purpose. 90 This provision attempts to minimize the risk that personal information will be misused or abused.
91
The sixth provision, "Access," requires the organization to allow individuals the opportunity to access their personal information and to grant these individuals the ability to "correct, amend, or delete information where it is inaccurate." 92 The exception to this provision is where the expense of providing access greatly outweighs the risks associated with the individual's privacy or where the rights of a third person would be violated. 93 Finally, the seventh provision, "Enforcement," states that the privacy protection must have effective enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with the safe harbor principles. 9 4 The Safe Harbor Privacy Principles lay out the basic framework for this enforcement requirement:
85. See Safe Harbor, supra note 9, at 45,668. For certain "sensitive" information, the "opt out" requirement becomes an "opt in" requirement. See id. That is, for transfer and use of information such as medical or health conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, or information regarding the sexual preferences of the individual, the organization must receive the explicit approval from the individual that the information can be transferred or used. See id. As with the requirement of Notice, the agency exception of footnote 1 applies to choice as well. See id. at 45,667, n. 1. 
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At minimum, such mechanisms must include (a) readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms by which each individual's complaints and disputes are investigated and resolved by reference to the Principles and damages awarded where the applicable law or private sector initiatives so provide; (b) follow up procedures for verifying that the attestations and assertions businesses make about their privacy practices are true and that privacy practices have been implemented as presented; and (c) obligations to remedy problems arising out of failure to comply with the Principles by organizations announcing their adherence to them and consequences for such organizations. 95 Under the provisions of the Safe Harbor program, participation in Safe Harbor is completely voluntary, but it is not self-executing. 96 That is, an organization must take the affirmative step and self-certify annually to the Department of Commerce that it adheres to the Safe Harbor requirements. 97 Additionally, an organization must publicly announce their intention to do so. 98 Also, the Department of Commerce recommends that the organization state in its published privacy policy that it adheres to the Safe Harbor requirements. 99 These requirements to qualify for Safe Harbor can be met in one of Since the date of the compromise, politicians, commerce experts, and corporate directors have been split on their predictions of whether the program would be successful.' 0 2 While many have criticized the Safe Harbor program as providing little incentive for companies to join, others have been quick to stand behind the program and argue that it is a long-overdue unifying bridge between the U.S. and European approaches to data privacy.' 0 3 Some have expressed that the Safe Harbor provisions would collapse as U.S. companies would avoid complying with the unenforceable provisions,"" while others have expressed great satisfaction in the potential for increased efficiency and higher measure of certainty that the program would grant companies. 5 In reaction to these views, the following analysis will show how Safe Harbor has impacted U.S. parties in its first year. Part A of this analysis will address how U.S. companies have reacted to certification. Part B will analyze the benefits and costs recognized by U.S. parties, and Part C will weigh the costs and benefits to determine the impact of Safe Harbor on U.S. companies, U.S. citizens, and U.S. policy in general.
A. Review of the First Year: U.S. Companies React to Safe Harbor
On the opening date of the program, many felt that U.S. companies would be slow to join." 7 To a large degree, this has been true. On February 1, 2001, three months into the program, only twenty companies were on board receiving certification." 8 By May 1, 2001, six months into the program, the number of companies had increased to a mere thirty-nine."' 9 The consistent slow growth continued throughout the first year as by August 1, 2001, the number of companies certified under safe harbor had increased only to This equation, however, does not consider other factors that may drive the trend out of linear growth. First, the idea that more companies will be willing to join as they see more companies become certified, see Assay, supra note 3, at 158, implies exponential growth, under which, the curve begins a low horizontal line near the x axis (y increases minimally while x increases greatly) until it hits a range where the curve begins to climb. It climbs to where the curve is nearly, but never actually becomes, a vertical line (x increases minimally for a very large increase in y).
If U.S. organizations begin to become more comfortable with Safe Harbor and the growth become exponential, the curve will at some future point return to a consistent linear growth as EU enforcement and industry regulation becomes routine practice. However, for this analysis, there is no way to assess at what point companies will begin applying for certification at a higher rate.
Second, the linear interpretation fails to take into effect other cause-and-effect factors such as EU enforcement (or lack of enforcement), industry international trade situations, and other economic trends. See Featherely, supra note 160. Any of these factors could effect, likely negatively, U.S. companies' applying for certification. See id.
[Vol. 12:2 By February 16, three and a half months into the program, only twentyone companies had applied for certification."
12 One information technology journalist noticed that with the exception of Hewlett Packard Company and The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, all of the certified companies were small to medium size businesses." ' 3 It appeared that the larger Fortune 500-type companies were either "investigating their options or taking a wait-and-see approach." ' " 4 As the large U.S. companies were showing their reluctancy to join, many were calling the program an early failure.' 15 One member of Congress argued that Republicans and the corporate sector were trying to block privacy measures that have been introduced at both the federal and state levels." 6 The reluctancy of large companies to join, however, did not last long. By October 31, 2001, the end of the first year of the Safe Harbor program, a number of large corporate entities had been approved for certificationY 7 Many of these larger corporations did not join until seven months or more after the start of the program."' Just recently, in October 2001, Eastman Kodak, Gateway and Pennzoil-Quaker State sought certification. " 9 Thus, it appears that although many larger corporations did not join the program within the first couple of months after its inception, many started joining by the end of the first year. 
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Fortune 500 companies such as Intel and Proctor & Gamble. 24 The addition of these giant, industry-leading firms has not only proven that such companies will adhere to the Safe Harbor principles," z but many feel that it was the stepping stone needed for other companies to join.'
26
B. CostlBenefit Analysis of Safe Harbor
(1) Benefits
The Safe Harbor program provides benefits for both the U.S. as a whole and for individual U.S. organizations.'
27 First, participating with Safe Harbor offers organizations a higher level of certainty and predictability.' 28 This is noticed primarily in the presumption of "adequacy" provided to companies certified under Safe Harbor.' 29 That is, once certified, an organization will be deemed "adequate" under the EU Directive, thereby binding all fifteen EU Member States, and will continue to receive transfer of data from EU Member States.' .. is the single most important step that businesses can take to ensure that consumers' privacy will be respected and protected."' ' 3 1 With regard to Safe Harbor, Ms. Lawler stated, "[I]t's the ultimate 'self-regulatory' approach."' ' 39 In a later interview, speaking on joining Safe Harbor, Ms. Lawler asserted, "If corporations are serious about following the self-regulation approach, rather than having to deal with privacy regulations, then this is what they should be looking at." '14 This benefit extends beyond individual organizations and reaches the U.S. policy as a whole. 4 ' Not only has the U.S. Department of Commerce negotiated a regime that will allow U.S. companies to continue receiving private personal data from EU Member States, thus dodging the potentially enormous economic hit valued by many economists as being in the billions of dollars,' 4 2 but in the program's providing the benefits listed above to individual companies, the U.S. policy on self-regulation is actually strengthened.' 43 In the conflict between the European and U.S. approaches towards information privacy policies, many felt that the EU's Directive threatened national sovereignty as the EU insisted that its Directive be treated as the de facto global standard.'" As it is understandable that the EU desires to protect the objectives of the Directive, which are feared to be lost if third countries were not bound by the "adequacy" standards,' 4 I believe that the EU Privacy Directive may act as a de-facto privacy standard on the world... [lit certainly is an effort to impose the EU's will on the U.S. While I recognize that similar charges have been laid against certain U.S. policies, the EU Privacy Directive could be the imposition of the one of the largest free trade barriers ever seen and is a direct reversal of the efforts we have made in various free trade agreements. It certainly provides for extraterritorial enforcement of EU principles on Americans and American companies. Id. at 5-6. The Chairman further stated, "I have serious reservations about the real impact of the EU Privacy Directive on commerce and trade. I am very concerned that U.S. companies, which have been the creators and the leaders of E-commerce, will be forced to deal with such a restrictive concept." Id. at 6.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021, commonly referred to as The Helms-Burton Act, in an attempt to protect the property rights of American citizens whose property was confiscated without compensation by the Castro regime. See id. The Act imposed sanctions on those who profited off the stolen property. See id. In its response to the act the EU issued the following statement: The European Union is opposed to the use of extraterritorial legislation, both on legal and policy grounds. In the last few years there has been a surge of U.S. extraterritorial sanctions legislation [both at federal and sub-federal level]. Such laws represent an unwarranted interference by the U.S. with the sovereign rights of the EU to legislate over its own citizens and companies, and are, in the opinion of the EU, contrary to international law.
Hearings, supra note 15, at 47 (statement by Jonathan M. Winer, Counsel, Alston and Byrd LLP). For more on the topic of the EU overreaching its power see Thibodeau, supra note 136.
145. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 66 (testimony of Joel R. Reidenberg, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law). "I would disagree with the assessments that this is an extraterritorial application of European law, because I think that it is the European Union saying, 'If it is European origin data, we want to be sure that our local privacy rules are not circumvented oversees."' Id.
[Vol. 12:2 or face the consequences is over reaching their rights.'" Therefore, the fact that the U.S. came out of the negotiations maintaining its self-regulatory approach, refraining from enacting broad legislation, and implementing a program that has proven beneficial in giving more guidance and uniformity to individual industry self-regulatory standards has led the U.S. to a stronger overall policy.' 47 Third, claims that are brought by citizens of EU Member States against organizations certified under Safe Harbor against the organization's use or transfer of personal information will be heard in the U.S., subject to limited exceptions. 4 ' Enforcement of these claims will be carried out in accordance with U.S. law, primarily by the private sector.' 49 This private sector selfregulation and enforcement is backed by federal and state unfair and deceptive statutes.'°F inally, organizations certified under Safe Harbor may recognize increased consumer confidence and approval as the concern of personal privacy issues continues to grow.' 5 ' In her statement to the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, Ms. Lawler asserted, "We believe that consumer confidence will be enhanced by ensuring customer privacy rights on-and off-line in a global commerce environment. E-commerce will grow faster if consumer confidence is reinforced by company efforts to ensure consumers have an effective recourse for privacy complaints through agreements like the Safe Harbor."' 2 146. See id. at 6 (testimony of Hon. W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman, CEC). Chairman Tauzin stated, "I must admit that I take a dim view about the way the EU went about enacting this new privacy regime. The EU designed the rules and told the U.S. companies to abide by them or risk losing the transfer of any data from European nations. In essence, do it or suffer the consequences." id.
147 interview, Agilent's director of customer privacy, Jim Allen, was quick to point out "Agilent places the highest priority on customer privacy." Id. Mr. Allen further stated, "Our company's global privacy policies are consistent with the European Union's principles for data protection, so our signing the safe harbor agreement is a logical next step in our commitment to customer privacy. In signing this critical agreement, we want to reassure our European customers that we treat their data in the most ethical manner." Id.
152. Hearings, supra note 15, at 79 (statement of Barbara Lawler, Manager, Customer Privacy, Hewlett-Packard Company).
(2) Costs
That is not to say, however, that there are no costs associated with an organization's certification under the Safe Harbor principles.
First, certification may require that the organization make significant changes to its information practices.' Second, upon certification, the organization runs into an immediate decision of whether to provide the privacy protection to only EU citizens, as required, or whether it should extend the protection to U.S. consumers as well. " Either way, the organization is likely to meet additional costs and work itself into a couple of additional problems.
5 5 First, as a matter of good business practice, it may not be in the best interest of the organization to deny equal protection to U.S. consumers.1 5 6 To do otherwise would be to treat the citizens of one's own country as second-class to EU citizens. 57 However, in granting the protection, the company risks lost transactions.' Additionally, in embracing more than one standard, the organization enters the difficult task of managing more than one level of protection and enforcement associated with different standards."S 9
Third, there are costs associated with implementing enforcement mechanisms to investigate and verify consumer complaints." 6 Finally, the organization has potential liabilities that it may incur if it fails to fulfill its obligations under the Safe Harbor provisions.' 6 ' These liabilities could take the form of negative publicity campaigns, requirements to delete information or provide compensation for losses incurred, potential "delisting" where the organization continues to fail to comply, and potential liability for In the nature of a compromise, both the EU and the U.S. gained some benefit at some cost in their agreement to accept the Safe Harbor program. 6 3 U.S. companies, for example, would have preferred Safe Harbor principles that would be words without effect, leaving them free to maximize their autonomy to profit from the use of personal data." The EU, on the other hand, would have preferred that the U.S. abandon its self-regulatory system and enact broad-privacy laws in accordance with the Directive's standards. 65 As a result of the compromise, however, the Safe Harbor provisions bind U.S. companies certified under the program to the standards set out in the Directive, securing the EU's chief objective,'66 but they also protect U.S. companies' autonomy to self-regulate and the U.S. government from being required to enact broadprivacy legislation, thus, securing the U.S.'s key objective. 1 67 With respect to the benefits and costs listed in the proceeding section, the following analysis will measure the impact of the Safe Harbor program on U.S. companies, U.S. citizens, and U.S. policy in general.
As its primary loss, U.S. companies lost ground on their ability to maximize profits from the use of personal information gathered from EU Member States." However, to date, it is not clear that U.S. companies are reaping this effect.' 69 In a recent study conducted by Anderson Consulting, American companies doing business oversees electronically failed to implement many of the minimum data privacy protections laid out in the Safe Harbor Principles.
7 ' Of seventy-five Fortune 500 and medium-sized companies polled, 7 ' none of the companies had privacy policies that met even six of the seven Safe Harbor Principles and only two of the companies had policies that met five of the principles.
1 2 Enforcement was found to be the least complied with principle with only five percent of companies maintaining procedures to assure compliance while describing recourse for individuals whose privacy is breached.' 73 However, the study also showed that the EU has been very slow to enforce the provisions of its Directive, let alone the principles of the Safe Harbor program.' 74 Therefore, from a U.S. company's prospective, not much has changed, as for the most part companies are not substantially changing their privacy policies. 75 This could change quickly if the EU decides to increase its enforcement against U.S. companies.
However, even if the EU does increase enforcement, it is still unclear as to the degree they will enforce the principles and whether the degree of force shown will lead U.S. companies to apply for certification.171
With respect to U.S. citizens, it has been argued that in initiating the Safe Harbor program, U.S. consumers may be treated as "second class citizens within their own country"' 7 ' as U.S. companies will be required to provide a higher level of privacy protection to citizens of EU Member States than to U.S.
citizens.'
79 Thus far, however, this has not shown to be the case. First, as U.S. companies are becoming certified under Safe Harbor and applying its seven principles, they are finding it more difficult to keep multiple databases to distinguish EU citizens from U.S. citizens than to merely apply equal privacy policies across the board to all consumers.'"0 Second, most U.S. companies complying with the Safe Harbor principles are finding the "good business" factor of providing higher levels of privacy beneficial to their public image.' 8 '
Therefore, due to individual companies analyzing the costs and benefits associated with applying the Safe Harbor principles to U.S. citizens and finding that it is more beneficial for them to grant U.S. citizens an equal level of protection, U.S. citizens are gaining protection and assurance under Safe
Harbor. 182
With respect to U.S. policy, many feel that the U.S. lost a piece of its ultimate sovereignty by compromising with the Safe Harbor principles in that, under Safe Harbor, the Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade
Commission have the responsibility of providing overall enforcement on the principles as originally laid out in the Directive. 8 3 While the U.S. may have conformed to certain provisions of the Directive, the U.S. refrains from enacting broad legislation under the compromised framework.' If the U.S. would have adopted broad legislation, it would have fallen at the feet of what many consider an economic threat from the EU. 8 5 However, the compromise allowed the U.S. to maintain its self-regulatory approach, leaving for the most 179. See Assay, supra note 3, at 156. 180. See id. 181. See Microsoft Plans to Sign EU Document, supra note 107. In reaction to this concern, Microsoft has called Safe Harbor its "floor" for data protection company-wide and that the principles will be provided equally to citizens of all countries. See id.
See id.
Not discussed in the analysis, EU citizens will also be impacted by the issuance of Safe Harbor. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 44 (statement of David L. Aaron, Senior International Advisor, Dorsey & Whitney LLP). It is interesting that it is these individuals who were originally intended protection under the Directive, and yet, from their perspective it is unclear whether the Directive, let alone Safe Harbor, is succeeding at all. See id. A primary reason for this is the EU's lack of enforcement of the Directive in EU Member States. See id. If the EU were to step up enforcement, EU citizens may consider the protection as a benefit but may find the scale-back of U.S. companies offering services and products within their own country as too great a cost. See id. As the EU begins enforcing the Safe Harbor principles and finding certain U.S. companies as failing to provide "adequate" levels of privacy protection, European communities risk both long term economic loss as some companies will pull out of the European market altogether instead of revising their privacy policies and short term loss as companies will have to temporarily pull out of the market to update and revise their standards. 2002]
